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Counsel for the Suspect:
Massiah v. United States
and Escobedo v. Illinois
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Massiah and
Escobedo expand the constitutionalrole of legal counsel
beyond the traditional functions and duties surrounding trial type proceedings. The Court's rulings appear
to make the adversary atmosphere of the courtroom
a necessary ingredient of criminal investigations when
the "focus is on the accused" with the "purpose to elicit
a confession." The authors believe that the merite of
certain underlying constitutional issues have been obscured by the use of the right to counsel as a device
to protect such other rights. Furthermore, the authors
conclude that the individual's right to freedom from
compulsory self incrimination can be safeguarded by
less drasticalternativemeans which, unlike an expanded
right to counsel, do not contain potentialfor undesirable
extension beyond those types of investigations which
pose dangers of coercion.

Arnold N. Enker* and Sheldon H. Elsent
With all modesty, the Bar may well ask itself whether the
Supreme Court's two most recent tributes to the need for legal
counsel truly reflect a need for expansion of the lawyer's role,
or whether lawyers have not been dubiously involved in the
service of other ends, primarily because of their unquestioned
capacity, and perhaps duty, to impede police interrogation directed toward their clients.'
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
tMember of the New York Bar.
1. See the oft-quoted statement of Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in
Watts v. Indiana, 388 U.S. 49, 59 (1949):
Amid much that is irrelevant or trivial, one serious situation seems to
me to stand out in these cases. The suspect neither had nor was advised
of his right to get counsel. This presents a real dilemma in a free society. To subject one without counsel to questioning which may and is
intended to convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring
in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of crime, because, under our
adversary system, he deems that his sole duty is to protect his clientguilty or innocent-and that in such a capacity he owes no duty
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Two decisions handed down this past term, Massiah v. United
States2 and Escobedo v. Illinoiss extend the constitutional role of
counsel from the traditional function of preparing for and participating in a trial or trial type proceeding to the representation
and counseling of persons under police investigation where they
are under indictment, as in Massiah, or where, before indictment,
the "focus" of the police has turned to such persons with the
"purpose to elicit a confession," as in Escobedo. Thus, apparently, the Court has transformed this stage of the criminal investigation into an adversary proceeding as a matter of constitutional
right and has converted the decision to confess into a tactical
decision on the part of the defense.4
This article contends that the proper judicial control of police
investigations does not require that the investigatory process be
transformed into an adversary proceeding by constitutional right
and that such a concept, particularly when joined to such other

recent decisions as Gideon v. Wainoright,' and Douglas v. Cali-

fornia," creates unnecessary and undesirable impediments to police
investigation. Furthermore, discussion of the issue as one of right
to counsel obscures the underlying problems, tends to impede
discussion of alternative solutions, and indeed may assume the
existence of underlying constitutional rights which have not previously been considered to exist and which should not be recognized without careful consideration of their merits.
Reliance on counsel, moreover, through the sixth and fourteenth amendments, has other ramifications of questionable
desirability. The Court seems to have given principal attention
to only one type of criminal, pre-trial investigation. The new
doctrines, however, as presently formulated by the Court, may
apply to criminal investigations other than those conducted in
the police station, such as grand jury investigations and investigations conducted by administrative agencies which may look toward criminal prosecution. In these areas, application of these
new doctrines becomes more complex and undesirable.
whatever to help society solve its crime problem. Under this conception
of criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in
no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.
2. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
3. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
4. For the view that recent coerced confession cases seem to be imposing
the image of the adversary trial on the interrogation process, see Comment,
The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. Car. L. REv.
313, 320-27 (1964).
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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We submit that the Supreme Court's legitimate concern with
coercive or unfair police interrogation would be better served
by treatment with less potent medication than that provided
by the new right-to-counsel cases. Extension of other doctrines,
particularly the McNabb-Mallory doctrine of the federal courts,
and greater formalization of police interrogation procedures, as
by the requirement that a record be made of such proceedings,
may well serve as fully the Court's appropriate purposes without
risking the adverse side effects of the new counsel rules.
This article will explore Massiah and Escobedo, certain of the
underlying issues as well as the new solutions provided through
counsel, the scope and implications of this right to counsel, and
some of the alternative solutions available.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL BEFORE MASSIAH

AND ESCOBEDO
For approximately 25 years, until the time of Massiah, Escobedo, and their forerunners in various lower court' and state court
decisions" and Supreme Court dissents or concurrences,9 the
courts had taken their guidelines on the right to counsel from
the classic statement in Powell v. Alabama:10
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of
law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence,
or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him.

It should be noted that this statement concerns itself with the
role of counsel at proceedings. The concept of a proceeding is
left undefined, but the import of the Court's statement is such
7. E.g., Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963).

8. E.g., People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.ad 148, 193 N.E.d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d
841 (1963); People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651, 229
N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962); People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 927
N.Y.S.Qd 427 (1962); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445,
216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961); People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825,
200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1961).
9. E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959) (concurring opinion);
Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 511 (1958) (dissenting opinion); Crooker v.
California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958) (dissenting opinion).

10. 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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that "trial" is understood, as well as preparation for trial. Thus
the lawyer is called upon for his well-recognized functions of
examining witnesses, making arguments of law, including objections to evidence, and of organizing and preparing the case for
the defense.
It is undoubtedly true that the functions of counsel have expanded over the centuries."' Initially, the role of counsel appears
to have been confined to what we now call matters of law, relating to pleadings, motions, and exceptions. The role of counsel in
the development and adjudication of the facts is a concept of
more recent times 2 But this expansion of the role of counsel
merely represented a recognition that the fair resolution of issues
of fact, no less than the resolution of issues of law, requires legal
skills in investigating, organizing, and presenting evidence.
Since the Powell case the Supreme Court has been primarily
concerned with whether counsel must be provided for indigent
defendants in those situations where counsel might fulfill the
functions alluded to above. In Johnson v. Zerbst,"8 the constitutional right to counsel under the sixth amendment was construed
to mean that counsel must be supplied in the federal courts if
the defendant cannot afford to retain a lawyer of his own choosing. In the recent decision of Gideon v. Wainwright," this same
principle was extended to felony cases in the state courts. In
these cases the desirability of counsel's participation was obvious.
The question was whether a fair trial could not otherwise be
obtained so that the right involved was of constitutional
dimension.
Hamilton v. Alabama,5 where the Court reversed a state
court conviction for failure to provide counsel at a preliminary
arraignment, was an application of similar principles. The absence
of legal representation and advice at the arraignment precluded
the defendant from asserting certain defenses at the trial and
therefore created the possibility that Hamilton might have been
convicted despite the fact that he had not committed the offense
or had some other legal defense.
More difficult to understand is the Court's short per curiam
11. For a recent analysis of the historical development of the right to
counsel and its bearing on the problems discussed herein, see Comment, An
HistoricalArgument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,73
YAlm LJ. 1000 (1964).
12. See id. at 1018-30.
13. 804 U.S. 458 (1988).
14. 372 U.S. 385 (1963).
15. 868 U.S. 52 (1961).

1964]

COUNSEL FOR THE SUSPECT

51

opinion in White v. Maryland," which seems to foreshadow
Escobedo. This case also concerned the denial of counsel at a
preliminary arraignment. Here, however, the question concerned
the evidentiary use at trial of White's uncounseled plea of guilty
entered at that arraignment, a problem not greatly different from
the use at trial of an uncounseled confession given to the police
rather than to a judge. The use of this plea did not create a possibility that White might be wrongly or illegally convicted.' 7 The
absence of counsel created, rather, a situation where a defendant
was convicted who might otherwise have been acquitted for lack
of sufficient evidence. 8 Still the Court reversed the conviction on
the ground that White was denied his sixth amendment right to
counsel.
It has been suggested that the admission in White having
been a plea taken in open court before a judge was seemingly
"akin to trial."" Perhaps the impact of the formal guilty plea
was thought by some judges to be greater on a jury than that of
a confession 0 It may have been thought that a guilty plea is a
stronger admission of the legal conclusion of guilt. Perhaps,
finally, this was simply the easiest way to write the opinion in a
field the Court did not feel ready to treat extendedly. In any
event, White seems to represent a departure from the traditional
constitutional role of counsel in that, for the first time, a defendant was accorded a constitutional right to a lawyer who would
have helped him only to avoid making available to the court
legal, relevant evidence. At least, the briefness of the Court's per
curiam opinion lends itself to such a reading and glosses over the
issues raised by a functional approach to the problem of counsel.
In 1958 the right to counsel was invoked in a different context, that is, with respect to confessions allegedly coerced by the
police: Crooker v. Californid" and Cicenia v. Lagay. We need
not review the many coerced confession cases which had preceded
these. Suffice it to say that despite the prior decisions, many
16. 378 U.S. 59 (1963).

17. That is to say, convicted in violation of some right other than the
right to counsel. An argument at this point that the defendant has a right
to counsel in such a proceeding merely begs the question.
18. Apart from violation of the asserted right to counsel, such a conviction
cannot be deemed a wrong or illegal conviction.
19. Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MaN.

L. REv. 1, 57 (1963); see

United States v. Reincke, 833 Red 608, 611 (9d Cir. 1964) (semble).
20. See DeToro v. Pepersack, 82 F.2d 841, 348 (4th Cir. 1964).
21. 857 U.S. 433 (1958).
22. 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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police, whether through ignorance or guile, had continued their
efforts to extract confessions against the will of suspects. Certain
of the evasions were achieved by shifting from the more overt
forms of coercion, such as violence, to more subtle psychological
methods? 3 Success was rendered possible because of the
lack of physical evidence to support a charge of police pressures
and because the defendant's uncorroborated word was usually
rejected in favor of the testimony of police witnesses. To deal
with such problems, certain prophylactic rules have been evolved,
that is, rules which not only prohibit coercion but which also
cut through evasions and problems of proof by specifying certain
demonstrable conditions which shall be deemed inherently
coercive.
Foremost among such rules has been the McNabb-Mallory
doctrine in the federal courts, which excludes confessions obtained during a period of "unnecessary delay" in bringing the
defendant before a judicial officer for preliminary arraignment 4
Similarly, the right to counsel might serve as such a prophylactic
rule, since interrogation in the absence of counsel might be
deemed inherently coercive and the problems of proof would
similarly be simple. Evaluation of such a use of counsel will be
undertaken below. For historical purposes, however, it is enough
to note that such a rule was previously urged, though not precisely in these terms, in the two 1958 cases which have been

mentioned, Cicenia v. Lagay and Crooker v. California.
A bare majority of the Court rejected such a rule at that time,
pointing to its inflexibility and its broad sweep. Mr. Justice Harlan,
in the Cicenia opinion, also discussed the issue in a manner which
indicated the parallel function which such a rule would play to
the MoNabb-Mallory rule applicable in federal prosecutions.
... [P]etitioner would have us hold that any state denial of a defendant's request to confer with counsel during police questioning violates
due process, irrespective of the particular circumstances involved. Such
a holding, in its ultimate reach, would mean that state police could not
interrogate a suspect before giving him an opportunity to secure counsel. Even in federal prosecutions this Court has refrained from laying
down any such inflexible rule. See McNabb v. United States ...
Mallory v. United States... . 2 5
28. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 815 (1959), where a police
officer who knew the defendant personally was prevailed upon to abuse this
personal tie by telling him that the officer, with a pregnant wife, might lose
his job unless the defendant would confess.
24. Mallory v. United States, 854 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 818 U.S. 882 (1943).
25. 357 U.S. at 509.
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The following year, in Spano v. New York," the same four
justices who favored the use of a prophylactic-right-to-counsel
rule in the Cicenia situation also indicated their willingness to
adopt such a rule for police questioning after an indictment had
been returned. The majority, however, did not reach this question, but reversed Spano's conviction on the more traditional
ground that the confession had been coerced.

II. MASSIAH v. UNITED STATES
Some five years elapsed between Spano and the Court's decisions in Massiah (May 18, 1964)17 and Escobedo (June 22, 1964).
During that period Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker retired,
Justices Goldberg and White joined the Court, and a number of
principles which had been expressed in dissenting opinions began
to find their way into the Court's majority opinions.
Winston Massiah was a seaman who, according to the Government's evidence, was one of a ring of seamen and longshoremen who were smuggling cocaine from Chile into the United
States. In May of 1958 his ship was searched; cocaine was found
and linked to Massiah, both through the testimony of informers
and through circumstantial evidence. The cocaine package was
wrapped in adhesive tape and that tape was linked to a roll found
in Massiah's possession through microscopic comparison and the
analysis of a textile expert. Thus probable cause existed and
Massiah was arrested; in addition, there was sufficient evidence
to warrant an indictment, which was promptly returned.
The Government did not know who the other smugglers were
and lacked proof against those suspected. Two months later,
however, after additional evidence had been accumulated, a case
was developed against another seaman, one Jesse Colson. A
superseding indictment was returned, which named Massiah and
Colson as co-defendants. The investigation of course continued.
Shortly after the filing of the superseding indictment, Colson
agreed to cooperate with the investigation conducted by the
federal agents. As is not infrequently the case, his indictment
had induced him to this, and thus had acted as a catalyst for the
investigation. Massiah, in the meantime, had retained counsel.
Up to this point there had been no interrogation of Massiah,
except for brief interviews at the time of his arrest. In November
of 1959, Colson induced Massiah to enter into a discussion of
26. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
27. The Massiah case was tried in the Southern District of New York in
1961 and the appeal was argued initially before the Second Circuit in 1962;
the authors represented the Government on that appeal.
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the case in Colson's car. Colson permitted a federal investigative
agent to install a Schmidt radio transmitter under the front seat
of his car. The agent, who had a receiver in his own car, was
thus enabled to park near Colson and listen to the conversation
between Massiah and Colson in which Massiah made a number
of damaging admissions that were later introduced into evidence
at the trial.
Subsequently, in March of 1961, a broader superseding indictment was returned, naming thirteen defendants, including Massiah and Colson. It was on this indictment that the case was tried.
Colson was to have been a witness and could have testified
to Massiah's admissions and numerous other transactions. When
the trial began, however, Colson told Judge J. Skelly Wright"8
that his life had been threatened and that he was afraid to talk.
A mistrial was declared - the indictment was severed as to nine
defendants, who could not be tried without Colson's testimony and the case went to trial as to the four others without Colson.
Massiah's damaging admissions were then testified to solely by
the federal agent who had overheard them. All four defendants
were found guilty.
The Second Circuit affirmed Massiah's conviction, by a 2-1
vote," but the Supreme Court reversed. For the majority, Mr.
Justice Stewart stated:
Here we deal not with a state court conviction, but with a federal
case, where the specific guarantee of the Sixth Amendment directly
applies. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458. We hold that the petitioner
was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was
used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words,
which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had
been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.8 o

Here there was no interrogation, in the sense of the police interrogations to which we have referred, and no element of coercion.
Thus, the situation did not call for a prophylactic rule of the sort
discussed in connection with police-station interrogations. Nevertheless, the Court held that the absence of counsel rendered
Massiah's statements inadmissible.
One might have argued, before Escobedo, that indictment is
the point at which the right to counsel begins; so that any contact
between the Government and the defendant after this point
would have to be in the presence of counsel. If this had been the
28. Judge Wright, at that time a judge of the District Court of Louisiana,
was sitting in the Southern District of New York by designation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 292(c) (1958).
29. United States v. Massiah, 807 F.2d 62 (9d Cir. 1962).
80. 377 U.S. at 205-06.
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Court's intention - and from Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent in
Escobedo it appears that this is his view - such an analysis would
have been open to criticism for its very formalism. Since the majority in Escobedo drew the line in a very different manner, however, this point will be confined to footnote discussion.3
Since the role of counsel was not to be the making of legal
arguments nor the presentation or preparation of evidence, the
critical questions raised by Massiah are what functions the
Court envisioned for counsel, and what rights were thereby to
be secured. Presumably, the role of counsel was to advise Massiah
that what he said might be used against him and to advise him
that he should not discuss the case with anyone, even his confederates. What right of Massiah's was thereby secured is not
clear. Consider the situation which would have presented itself
31. Consider also Mr. Justice Stewarts concurring opinion in Spano v. New
York, 860 U.S. 815, 326-27 (1959). The argument is that once the defendant
has been indicted there is no longer any substantial need for the police to
question him, since, despite the fact that indictment does not necessarily
mean that the prosecution has proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it is ordinarily
indication of the prosecution's belief that it has enough evidence to convict.
Under such circumstances, the public interest in solving crimes no longer
weighs so heavily as to outweigh the defendant's interest in protection through
counsel. When the case has not yet reached the indictment stage, however,
affording counsel to the defendant might preclude solution of the crime and
successful prosecution of the offender. See People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561,
565-66, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447-48, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74-75 (1961); 76 HAnv. L.
REV. 1800, 1802 (1963).
In People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 150, 867 P2d 680, 695, 18 Cal. Rptr.
40, 55 (1961), Judge Traynor, concurring, criticized a rule which would draw
the line at indictment. As he pointed out, such a rule could easily be circumvented simply by delaying the indictment. Moreover, it is often the case that
only after indictment do the authorities discover that the criminal enterprise
was much broader in its scope than they had originally thought. Massiae is
a good example of a case where the indictment itself served to produce a witness who disclosed the broader outlines of the conspiracy. Under these circumstances additional investigation is required.
Much of the discussion of Massiah, both in the Second Circuit and in the
Solicitor General's brief for the Supreme Court, dealt with the problems of
such a continuing investigation and the use of Colson, the informer, for that
purpose. Colson could hardly 'have been used had the Government been
compelled to notify Massiah's lawyer that Colson was acting on behalf of
the Government. Mr. Justice Stewart concluded the opinion with the statement
that such a continuing investigation was permissible, except that the "defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the
circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial." 877 U.S. at 207. This conclusion
probably meant that statements made by Massiah to Colson about a third
person could be used as leads in the investigation of that person but not
against Massiah for only Massiah's rights were violated. See Greenwell v.
United States, 836 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dictum).
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if Colson had not yet decided to cooperate with the Government
at the time of his conversation with Massiah, if the two men had
held the same conversation, and if only then had Colson gone
to the agents with his story, including Massiah's admissions.
Presumably there would have been no legal barrier which would
have prevented Colson from testifying at the trial about this
conversation any more than there would have been a legal barrier against the use in evidence of any other post-indictment
admission made to a nonpolice witness by the defendant. The
Court's majority seems to have agreed with this point since it
stressed so heavily the fact that the Government agent had acted
deliberately to seek a confession.
Viewed as a question of Massiah's need for counsel, however,
that is, considering the function of a lawyer, Massiah would
have equally needed his lawyer during such a talk with Colson, his
friend who had not yet turned informer. The lawyer could have
given similar advice concerning the dangers Massiah would run by
producing witnesses against himself. Yet one senses that there
is a difference between this situation and the actual facts, a difference not fully explained by the fact that in the actual case
Massiah was damaging his interests more seriously since he was
producing as a witness a Government agent, someone whose
credibility would be less subject to attack than Colson's. If there
is a difference, it lies between the situation where a defendant
talks freely with a confederate, one he must know could at any
time turn against him, and the situation where he incriminates
himself by talking unknowingly directly into the ear of a law
enforcement official.
But suppose that at the time he induced Massiah to talk,
Colson had in fact decided to cooperate with the Government but
had not yet communicated his intentions to the authorities, desiring to come to them armed with some evidence. The absence of
any Government participation in the conversation would again
seem to make Massiah's statements admissible against him. Yet
this situation, too, poses no greater or lesser need for counsel by
Massiah than does the actual case. Counsel might have advised
his client of the possibility of trickery by Colson as much as of
governmental deceit.
The point is even more sharply drawn if we suppose that
Massiah had actually consulted with his counsel before talking
with Colson in the car.3 2 And suppose further that Massiah's
32. It is interesting to note that so far as the record in Massiah reveals,
Massiah may very well have consulted with his counsel before talking to
Colson. There was no testimony at the trial that Massiah did not consult
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counsel had actually advised him to discuss the case with Colson,
perhaps because he wanted Massiah to find out as much as he
could about Colson in support of a defense theory which would
try to shift the onus of guilt onto Colson. Suppose, for that matter, Massiah's attorney had actually been present in Colson's
car during the conversation. Under such circumstances, we think
it could hardly be supposed that it is Massiah's right to counsel
that is being infringed upon. Yet, whatever impropriety existed
in the Government's contact with Massiah would exist no less
here. The fact that both the actual case and this hypothetical
case should be decided the same way suggests that the issue is
something other than the defendant's need for the protection
of counsel.
Thus, we submit that the real problem facing the Court in
Massiah was not one of the right to counsel but rather the permissible extent of governmental deceit inherent in undercover
work and the use of informers. The real issue presented in Massiah is whether law-enforcement officials may seek evidence from
an accused's own mouth when the accused does not realize that
he is talking to such officials and is providing them with evidence
that will help to convict him. This is not a problem of the scope
of the right to counsel, but one of the scope of the fifth amendment right against self incrimination?" Consideration of the case
with his counsel, and certainly none that he was prevented from doing so.
The reason for this is simply that Massiah never argued before the District
Court that he was deprived of his right to counsel, the Supreme Court's
statement in its opinion that the testimony was received "despite the insistent
objection of defense counsel," 377 U.S. at 208, to the apparent contrary
notwithstanding. Massiah's counsel did indeed object to the receipt of this
evidence but on different grounds: (1) that the electronic eavesdropping
allegedly violated the fourth amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures, (2) that Colson had entrapped Massiah, and (3) that the bestevidence rule required that Colson, not the Government agent, testify. Counsel
for another defendant objected on the ground that the agent had -not identifled Massiah's voice sufficiently. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 21-22, 36-38,
United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962). The Court of Appeals
noted that the contentions concerning Massiah's right to counsel were not
raised at the trial, 307 F.2d at 65, but proceeded to the merits of the issue
without discussing the Government's argument that the issue should not be
entertained because it was first raised at this late stage. Under the circumstances, then, the argument that Massiah's right to counsel was infringed
may have been factually groundless.
33. The problem of electronic eavesdropping also was present in the case.
This issue, which could have been treated as one aspect of the -problem of
self incrimination, was raised by counsel in terms of violation of Massiah's
fourth amendment right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. The

Court did not discuss this problem.
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in terms of the right to counsel only obscures the real issue involved and conceals what is in reality a substantial extension of
the fifth amendment's protection. It may be, indeed, that cases
such as Leyra v. Denno" and Spano already contain the germ
of such an idea and should be extended to cover additional forms
of trickery in official questioning of suspects." That question,
however, is beyond the scope of this article. The point is that
the issues involved in such an extension should be met head on
and should not be obscured by disposing of the case in terms of
the right to counsel, an issue fortuitously present, if at all present,
in the actual case.
III. ESCOBEDO v. ILLINOIS
Massiah was a federal case while Escobedo v. Illinois,," decided one month later, arose from the state courts. It would
appear, however, that in view of the Court's recent decisions
that the fourteenth amendment makes the fifth and sixth amendments binding on the States,"7 the origin of the case had no effect
on the result.
Danny Escobedo was convicted of murdering his brother-inlaw. On the night of the murder he was arrested without a warrant, interrogated, and released on habeas corpus after two and
one half hours. He had retained a lawyer who advised him what
to do in the event of interrogation. About eleven days later, another man, DiGerlando, who was already in custody and was later
indicted for the murder with Escobedo, told the police that
Escobedo had fired the fatal shots. The police arrested Escobedo,
took him to the station, and confronted him with DiGerlando's
accusation. Escobedo refused to talk until he had seen his lawyer.
The lawyer appeared, asked to see his client, and was refused.
For a moment he caught sight of Escobedo in the station and
they waved to each other. Eventually he made a complaint and
left. The police apparently admitted that they told Escobedo
his lawyer did not want to see him. After this, Escobedo, when
confronted by DiGerlando, accused the latter of firing the fatal
shots. This admission by Escobedo, that he had knowledge of
the crime, led to additional admissions that became evidence
sufficient to convict him. The Court pointed out that an Assistant
34. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
85. See Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical
View, 52 J.Cnaw. L., C. &P.S. 21, 32 (1961).
86. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
37. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S.
85 (1968).
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State's Attorney participated in the later phases of questioning
and also that Escobedo was probably unaware that an admission
of complicity in the murder plot was legally as damaging as an
admission of firing the fatal shots.
After recounting the facts, Mr. Justice Goldberg began his
analysis of the case by mentioning the question of coercion. He
did not discuss or analyze that issue, however, except to note that
the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, holding that there
had been no coercion, was not binding on the United States
Supreme Court. He made no reference to the fact of persistent
abuses by the police despite the previous coerced confession cases
or to the need for a prophylactic rule or other safeguards.
Instead, without treating what we submit was the real vice in
Escobedo, the persistent and secluded questioning of the suspect,
the Court plunged immediately into its recent decision in
Massiah. Rejecting the stage of indictment as the time at which
the right to counsel accrues, Justice Goldberg pointed to the two
factors stressed in Massiah: that as a practical matter the defendant was at the time an accused, and that the police purpose in
the interrogation was "to 'get him' to confess,"" as the Customs
Agent's purpose in Massiah was deliberately to seek a confession.
Indictment was dismissed as a formal test resting on fortuitous
circumstances and a new test was enunciated:
We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a
confession - our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the
circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his
lawyer.so

Now here there was no doubt that Escobedo knew he was
talking to officials, so that there was not the problem of surreptitious official contact with an accused which we have suggested
actually underlay the decision in Massiah. Here, if there was an
implicit assumption of novel rights, they were not the same as
those assumed in Massiah. Nevertheless, presumably here also
the function of counsel would have been to advise silence, or to
make a tactical decision on whether or not to confess. Yet the
Court again did not clearly specify what rights of the accused
counsel was supposed to protect.
The Court did discuss the fact that the police had not advised
Escobedo of his right to remain silent. However, Escobedo, as
noted, had previously consulted with his attorney who had ad38. 378 U.S. at 485.
39. Id. at 492.
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vised him of his rights. Moreover, when Escobedo saw his lawyer
motion to him in the police station that night, he, by his own
testimony, took this to impart renewed advice to maintain silence.
Therefore, it seems doubtful that the failure of the police to so
advise him was central to the Court's decision.40
It is possible that the Court was doing nothing more than
engaging in an abstract literal interpretation of the constitutional
mandate that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."" One may approach the problem solely in terms of the abstract question at
what point do "criminal prosecutions" commence. Under such
an approach it would be difficult to deny the logic of an argument
that criminal prosecution has begun at the point of arrest and
interrogation and certainly at indictment. To an extent, the New
York cases" which preceded Massiah and Escobedo (and which
were cited approvingly by the Court) seem to take just this approach. But this kind of sterile legal analysis has been rightly
condemned by contemporary writers and its question-begging
tendencies are today fully recognized." It is unlikely that the
Court was taking such an approach.
At some points the Court seems to approach the problem in
terms of waiver of fundamental rights and to apply the wellestablished notion that a valid waiver requires full knowledge of
such rights.4 This, too, merely begs the question, since it assumes
that there exists a right to be waived. If there were a right not
to confess, for example, as distinguished from a right not to be
compelled to confess, then a voluntary confession could be deemed
a waiver of the right. But if the accused's right is not to be compelled to confess, as the Constitution seems to say, and as the
courts had previously construed it," then a person who volun40. See text accompanying notes 50-54 infra.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
42. See cases cited note 8 supra.
48. See, e.g., Fulma & BRAUCHER, BAsIc CONTRACT LAw 443-48 (2d ed.
1964). See also People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 185, 161, 867 Ped 680, 698, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 40, 58 (1961) (concurring opinion).
44. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 804 U.S. 458 (1988).
45. Witnesses, no less than suspects and those already accused, may
maintain absolute silence when questioned by the police. This is not a matter
of right but of the witness's power of silence which arises simply from the
fact that he is under no legal compulsion to give the police any information.
See Weisberg, supra note 85, at 28. Until Escobedo, witnesses, suspects, and
apparently even those already accused, could have been subpoenaed to testify
before the grand jury. See, e.g., United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459 (Qd
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 986 (1959); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113
(2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 850 U.S. 897 (1956). Since such witnesses were
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tarily confesses has not waived any of his rights. As noted, the
Court does not say what underlying right is the subject of its
attention. The foregoing suggests, however, that the Court may
be creating a novel right not to confess except knowingly and
with the tactical assistance of counsel.
The test formulated by the Court in Escobedo requires counsel
only when the police "purpose is to elicit a confession." Such a
standard directs itself to the problem of coerced confessions, and
seemingly points up the Court's concern with this problem and
its invocation of counsel as a device to protect defendants from
police coercion.4 6 It suggests that the Court in the future may
limit the new right to counsel to potentially coercive situations.
Thus, under the Escobedo test, when a person spontaneously volunteers a confession - as distinguished from one who confesses
in response to police questioning - the confession would
be admissible in evidence even though such person was not
advised by counsel prior to confessing, since there was no police
"purpose to elicit a confession." The lengthy quotation from Dean
Wigmore at page 489 of the opinion with its emphasis on "compulsory self-disclosure" lends further support to this view. If so,
we contend later on that other more workable and less drastic
measures are available to accomplish the desired result. It should
be noted, however, that People v. Meyer4 was among the New
York cases cited approvingly by the Court in Massiah.5 In that
case after preliminary arraignment before a magistrate, the defendent raised with one of the police officers the question of what
kind of a deal he could get if he admitted his complicity in the crime
alleged. Receipt of this unsolicited statement into evidence at the
trial was held reversible error since the defendant did not have
under legal compulsion to testify, they could invoke the fifth amendment's
protection if the answers might incriminate them. But they could not refuse
to appear or refuse to answer questions on grounds other than possible self
incrimination. In other words, there was really no such thing as a right to
silence. As to the possible impact of Escobedo on these cases involving questioning of suspects before the grand jury, see text accompanying notes 81-86
infra.
46. Recent law review discussion of the right to counsel seems to treat
the problem largely in terms of protecting defendants from abusive and
coercive questioning. E.g., Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The
Right to Counsel and to PromptArraignment, 27 Booxix L. REv. 24, 60-65
(1960); Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 81
U. Cm. L. REV. 313 (1964); Comment, An HistoricalArgument for the Right
to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE LJ. 1000 (1964). But see
Kamisar &Choper, supra note 19, at 60.
47. 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.Rd 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962).
48. 878 U.S. at 486.
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counsel at that point. But Meyer did not involve a situation in
which there was any danger of police coercion. And, as previously
indicated, Massiah itself did not arise in a context which called
for such a prophylactic rule.49
Moreover, the argument in Escobedo was not limited to the
facts at hand, to the problem of coercion and the creation of prophylactic rules. Rather, it broadly criticized a system of criminal
justice that "comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on
the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights." 0 Repeated stress was placed by the Court on
Escobedo's alleged ignorance.51 But it is proper to ask at this
point just what kind of advice the Court had in mind. One would
not argue with an approach which considers highly relevant the
question whether the defendant was advised that he is not compelled to answer any questions. Such knowledge fortifies the
defendant's will to resist extended questioning without eliminating a truly voluntary confession. In short, absent police abuses,
such advice guarantees the voluntariness of any resulting confession." At points in the opinion the Court does in fact seem
49. Mr. Justice Stewart attempted to meet the point that Massiah was not
interrogated under potentially coercive circumstances by quoting from Judge
Hays' dissent in -the Court of Appeals: "[lf such a rule is to have any efficacy
it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogation as well as those conducted in the jailhouse." 877 U.S. at 206. It is a proper rejoinder to point out
that the use of such "indirect" means to elicit confessions eliminates the danger
of coercion. The quoted statement suggests, then, that the "efficacy" the Court
has in mind may be something more than protection from coercion. The possible
implication in People v. Downs, 8 N.Y.ad 860, 168 N.E.2d 710, 203 N.Y.S.2d
908, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 867 (1960), to the effect that volunteered confessions may be admissible though made in the absence of counsel seems to
be foreclosed now in New York by Meyer. See also People v. Waterman, 9
N.Y.2d 561, 566, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 75 (1961). But of.
People v. McElroy, 252 N.Y.S.2d 597, 599-600 (Albany County Ct. 1964).
50. 378 U.S. at 490.
51. Id. at 485 & n.5, 486.
52. As Mr. Justice White said, dissenting in Escobedo:
The failure to inform an accused that he need not answer and that his
answers may be used against him is very relevant indeed to whether
the disclosures are compelled. Cases in this Court, to say the least,
have never placed a premium on ignorance of constitutional rights. If
an accused is told he must answer and did not know better, it would
be very doubtful that the resulting admissions could be used against
him. When the accused has not been informed of his rights at all the
Court characteristically and properly looks very closely at the surrounding circumstances. See Ward v. Texas, 816 U.S. 547; Haley v.
Ohio, 832 U.S. 596; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560. I would continue
to do so....

378 U.S. at 499. It may be noted that the English requirement of a caution contained in the Judges' Rules evolved from such a concern with voluntariness.
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to limit its concern to the defendant who is unadvised as to this
right. 5
Home Office Circular, The Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions to the
Police, 1964 Cam. L. Rav. (Eng.) 165, 166-70. The requirement apparently was
laid down in response to a police request for judicial guidelines as to when a
confession was voluntary. DEvwN, THE CinNAL PRosECUo IN ENGLAND
89-40 (1958).
To impose an absolute requirement that the police administer a caution
would go too far. Such a requirement would raise the difficult problem of
determining at what point the caution must be administered. It also would
lack the flexibility present in the English practice whereby the judges have
discretion to admit confessions despite police failure to comply with the Rules.
The Court touched upon the English Judges' Rules, both in the majority
opinion, 878 U.S. at 487 n.6, and in Mr. Justice White's dissent, id. at 495-96,
but not with respect to the requirement that the police caution a suspect. It
dealt rather with the restrictions on interrogation which are imposed after the
suspect has been charged or informed that he may be prosecuted. The majority pointed to language in English articles which suggested that the English
had found such restrictions on interrogation desirable, and the dissent pointed
to language which suggested that the English had found such restrictions
unworkable.
This exchange suggests that one purpose of the majority may have been
to import an English custom which it admired, the Judges' Rules, but which
it lacked authority to impose through rule-making power and which it could
only bring in through some constitutional doctrine. The requirement of
counsel, with its concomitant limitations on police interrogation, may have
been conceived of as such a device.
It is not our purpose to attempt an appraisal of the English experience.
It may be observed, nevertheless, that there are aspects of English practice
which may make the Judges' Rules more workable there.
In the first place the English Judges' Rules are more flexible in application. As already noted, the trial judge is given discretion to exclude admissions or confessions obtained in violation of the Rules but is not required
to exclude them. The rules are detailed, with much more precise guidelines
to the police than Escobedo affords, and with the kind of exceptions and
qualifications which administrative rules can afford and flat constitutional
prohibitions cannot.
In the second place, as Lord Devlin has observed, the English rules are
applied by a much smaller bar whose members may act one day as a prosecutor and the next day as defense counsel. Therefore, more responsible application of the rules, on both sides, is likely. The police are less likely to abuse
the rules, for their counsel will himself refuse evidence which he thinks the
court will or should disapprove, and the defense lawyer is less likely to abuse
his rights and privileges. See Devlin, op. cit. supra at 25-27. In this country
adversary lines are more sharply drawn, particularly by career prosecutors
and a significant portion of the criminal defense bar. Thus, enforcement of
the Judges' rules in England is self-imposed to a degree far more than is
possible in this country. If the English are having troubles, even under such
relatively favorable conditions, we should hesitate before we seek to import
their practices.
53. 378 U.S. at 490, 491-92. Compare Mefford v. State, 235 Md. 497, 201
A.2d 824 (1964).
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But, one may observe, Escobedo was aware of this right, having been so advised by his attorney previously and having taken
his lawyer's wave of the hand to counsel silence. The Court then
seems to be concerned not only that the defendant understand
his constitutional rights, but that he also be advised by a lawyer
whether or not to exercise such rights at each stage of the questioning. In replying to the argument that Escobedo was already
advised of his rights, Mr. Justice Goldberg argued that he had
not been advised what to do "in the face of a false accusation
that he had fired the fatal bullets."5 4 Of course, counsel in advising his client how to react in the face of possible future interrogation can never anticipate every possible question and every
conceivable accusation that may be put to his client. The argument, then, reduces itself to the proposition that not only should
a defendant be made aware of his rights, but that he is entitled
to be advised at each step of the interrogation concerning
whether or not to respond and how to respond, i.e., the tactics of
the defense. This proposition no longer speaks of voluntariness
but elevates the decision to confess to a tactical decision. Yet
the Court gave no reason in its opinion for this departure from
the traditional test of the validity of a confession. Its strictures
against a system which depends upon ignorance are stated in
the context of ignorance of rights, not of these tactical considerations.
Possibly the Court's true concern lay not with Danny Escobedo and Winston Massiah, who had hired their own lawyers,
but with the many defendants who cannot afford legal advice.
The argument for an extended right to counsel may be based
on the belief that wealthy and experienced defendants know
enough not to talk unless so advised by counsel, and that the
impact of police questioning falls most heavily, almost exclusively,
on the poor, ignorant, unbefriended defendant - in short, a sort
of equal protection argument. 5 Authority for such an argument
might be sought in Griffin v. Illinois' and Douglasv. California."
Although the potential scope of Grifn and Douglasis unclear and
has evoked much comment, 58 they would not appear to carry this
far. As Mr. Justice Black pointed out in Griffin, given the high
percentage of reversals in criminal appeals, the first appeal is in
54. Id. at 485 n.5.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Of. Kamisar & Choper, supra note 19, at 59-61.
351 U.S. 1 (1956).
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 360 (1963) (Harlan, J.,

dissenting); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal
Defendants, 47 MiN. L. Rnv. 1054, 1067-70 (1968).

1964]

COUNSEL FOR THE SUSPECT

65

fact an extension of the trial." The denial of a transcript or of
counsel at the first appeal may, therefore, result in many miscarriages of justice resulting solely from the accused's indigency.
Thus, although due process may not require a State to afford
anyone an appeal, a State may not provide this significant extended protection from illegal convictions for some defendants
and deny it to others solely because of their indigency. This
reasoning does not support an argument that because some defendants, by virtue of their wealth or experience, are able to avoid
legal and just convictions, all defendants, including the indigent
and ignorant, must be given a like opportunity. Such would be a
new concept and an extreme extension of Grifn and Douglas,
truly without definable limits.
Or, perhaps, there is now a notion that there is something per
se improper in a powerful State dealing with weak and lonely
citizens, i.e., a notion of equality not between defendants but
between the State and each defendant it confronts:
Counsel, then, has been more than a technical aid; he has served to
overcome the original unfairness of the balance of state against individual. Historically, this role has been played mainly at trial-the
focus of confrontation [between the state and the individual]. If, however, a critical confrontation occurs at the earlier investigative stage of
the process, we might have to alter our conception of the role counsel
must play to readjust the balance. 60

The assumption underlying this argument is that, regardless
of whether there is official abuse or not, inequality between a
State and an individual is always bad and should be eliminated.
But inequality between the State and the accused during police
questioning does not pose the evils potentially present when such
inequality exists at trial. At trial, inequality between the State
and the individual will often result in a miscarriage of justice. The
innocent defendant who has no tools for investigation, no skills for
the organization and presentation of his story or for the crossexamination of his accusers, and who lacks the knowledge of the
relevant rules of procedural and substantive law, may quickly find
himself unjustly convicted. 1 Truth and justice will not often win
59. 351 U.S. at 18.
60. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1034 (1964); see United States v.
Guerra, 334 F.2d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 1964).
61. Professor Kamisar has suggested that the defendant in Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942), whom a majority of the court thought not to have
been prejudiced by the lack of counsel, may himself have been wrongly convicted. Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Dialogue on "the Most Pervasive Right" of the Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REv.
1, 42-56 (1969).
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in such an unequal contest. No less does the decision to plead
guilty require the advice of counsel, for the lay defendant often
needs legal advice as to whether his acts were in fact in violation
of the law.
No such dangers are present during police interrogation,
however. Indeed, the presence of counsel at this point may
very well result in the suppression of truth rather than its disclosure. This is because counsel, aware of the significance which
an accused's admissions may have in building the prosecution's
case, would normally tell his client to remain silent as a tactical
decision. As a result, not only will coerced confessions be eliminated, but so will voluntary ones which will generally contain
the truth. The accused's power is increased, but at the expense of
the search for truth.
We recognize that the achievement of truth is not the sole
value to be sought in a system of criminal procedure. Probative,
trustworthy evidence is often rejected to promote paramount
interests. Illegally seized physical evidence is the most obvious
example. Indeed, it is now recognized that the basis for the exclusion of coerced confessions lies not exclusively in their lack
of trustworthiness but in the broader values and interests that
are thought to be safeguarded by maintaining what we have come
to call an accusatory rather than an inquisitorial system of investigation and prosecution." Such interests include, for example,
the desire to protect the innocent citizen from the harassment of
police interrogation, particularly in the situation of mass roundups for questioning of suspects and those not quite so suspect.
Wong Sun v. United States, which excludes confessions elicited by
exploitation of illegal arrests, should go far toward eliminating
such abuses, particularly if its rule is extended to the States.0
The presence of counsel, on the other hand, serves this interest
to no greater extent and exacts the price of eliminating otherwise
proper questioning.
Some have suggested that "coercion" is in part a function of
62. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 865 U.S. 534 (1961); Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Con-

fession? Some Comments on Inban and Reid's Criminal Interrogations and
Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728 (1963); McCormick, The Scope of
Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. REv. 447, 450-57 (1938);

Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV.
411 (1954).
63. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). For an argument that Wong Sun should be so

extended, see Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and
Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 557-64 (1964).
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improper police practices." To the extent that such practices
have coercive tendencies they are of course relevant to the question of coercion, and extension of that concept to include such
considerations is laudable, proper, and the legitimate role of the
courts. To the extent that police practices have no coercive tendencies, however, any attempt to bring such practices under the
rubric of coercion is again, in reality, to recognize a new right.
The right to counsel, then, to the extent that it is more than an
expensive prophylactic rule designed to protect against coercion,
serves to protect no interest other than to make prosecution of
the guilty more difficult.
Perhaps there is involved here an extended notion of the dignity of the individual. To coerce a confession is to infringe upon
one's personality." Perhaps it is also a violation of one's dignity
to seek to impose disabilities upon him out of his own mouth.
If so, one must disallow all confessions, for it is a false notion of
the meaning of personality to allow one to impose disabilities
upon himself only if he knows what he is doing."6 To allow punishment based on a confession given as part of a "deal" with the
prosecutor in which the defendant gains some advantage is to
debase both the individual and the system. In any event the
moral issues are subtle; to impose such morality on a system
based upon the adversary principle may be to subvert one's ends.
Proponents of extension of the right to counsel have argued
that there would remain situations in which attorneys would
advise their clients to confess. If this be so, and we doubt it, we
venture the opinion that this would occur only in those cases
where the police had already built up such a solid case against
the defendant that the confession would be mere icing on the
cake. It has been suggested that counsel would advise his client
64. See authorities cited note 62 supra.
65. See DouGIAs, AN ALmAwAc oF LIBTY 238-40 (1954); 8 WIGMoRE,
EvmENcE § 2251, at 816-17 (McNaughton rev. 1961) and authorities collected
in na; Kamisar, supra note 61, at 7.
66. This principle, religious in its origin, perhaps underlies the view of
Rabbinic jurisprudence in the Talmud that a person's self-incriminating statements may never be accepted as evidence even if voluntarily made. B. Sanhedrin 6b. For a different interpretation of the Talmudic view based upon
the fear of untruthful confessions, see Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Code of
Jewish Law), Book of Judges, Laws of the Sanhedrin, c. 18, para. 6, 3 YALE
JUDAICA SmEIs 52-53. See also Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and its Equivalent in the Halakha, 5 JUDAISM 53 (Winter 1956). One of the commentators
on Maimonides, however, offers an explanation similar to that indicated here.
Radbaz on Maimonides, loc. cit.
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to confess where "full disclosure is exchanged for a lesser
charge."" Such an exchange poses serious problems of illegal
inducement. It is not a sufficient answer to the charge of coercion
that the decision to confess in exchange for a lesser charge was
made with the advice of counsel, and this merely removes the
moral and legal dilemma of plea bargaining from the district
attorney's office back to the police station and renders such bargaining even less subject to judicial control than it is today.8
In any event, our experience indicates that counsel would gain
no advantage for his client by advising him to confess to the
police which he could not gain later on in his negotiations with
the prosecutor. If anything, he would be giving up his one bargaining point without any assurance that the police can deliver
on their promise. And if the police failed to deliver, counsel would
have no assurance that the confession would be excluded from
evidence at the trial. Counsel can always get his client as good a
deal, and usually better, from the district attorney without running these risks.
Finally, we are told that no one really knows what effect the
presence of counsel will have on police interrogation. 9 The above,
it is said, ultimately rests upon speculation. But this speculation
is based upon the experience of those who have come into contact
with law enforcement as prosecutors or defense counsel and even
as judges. In any event, if we are to experiment with new procedures to safeguard established rights, prudence dictates that
we proceed with caution. Experience dictates that there may very
well be less drastic alternatives available.
67. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1049 (1964).
68. If the judge or prosecutor threatens the defendant with increased
penalties unless he pleads guilty, such a plea is involuntary. Walker v.
Johnson, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). Circumstances, no less than threats, might coerce a defendant into pleading guilty. Defendants in federal narcotics prosecutions often
plead guilty to a "tax count," INr. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7237, with its lesser
penalties rather than risk trial on a count based on 42 Stat. 596 (1922), as
amended, 21 U.S.C. § 173 (1958), which carries a nonsuspendable minimum
sentence of five years imprisonment for the first offense. We do not know how
often defendants have surrendered a triable defense so as not to risk the
greater penalties. See, e.g., People v. Codarre, 14 N.Y.2d 870, 200 N.E.2d
570, 251 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1964) (defendant should not be forced to make his
defense of insanity at the risk of the death penalty; guilty plea to seconddegree murder may 'be accepted although the evidence would not warrant a
charge to the jury on that degree). Such situations present grave danger of
coercion. A partial solution to the problem is to require closer judicial supervision over the "bargain," not removal of the bargaining process to the
police station.
69. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1049-50 (1964).
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IV. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF MASSIAH AND ESCOBEDO
Though the Court was not obliged to pass on all the ramifications of Massiah and Escobedo, it is submitted that such considerations cannot be avoided if the desirability and workability
of the new doctrines are to be appraised. A substantial step in
this direction was made by Mr. Justice White, dissenting in both
cases, but there are also many other problems which bear meaningfully on the viability of the Massiah and Escobedo holdings
as constitutional principles.
It may be that future litigation will see the Court limit the
right to counsel to potentially coercive situations, primarily police
station interrogations."o However, the present rationale offered
by the Court and the test, which is articulated in terms of focus
on the accused and purpose to elicit a confession, are far broader
in their scope than coercive situations and police station
interrogations.
Restriction of the right to counsel to potentially coercive situations is warranted only if counsel is thought of solely as a means
to protect defendants from coercive questioning. As we have seen,
however, the Court's rationale for its decision in Escobedo appears
to rest in part upon the proposition that an accused is entitled
to the tactical assistance of counsel at any stage in the proceedings which may turn out to be critical in the sense that it will
substantially affect the result at trial. If such a right exists it
should extend to noncoercive situations as well, since noncoercive
situations may also present the accused with the need to make
such major tactical decisions. Indeed, as indicated, Massiah itself
and the Court's approving citation of People v. Meyer"' indicate
that the rule may well be broad in its application. So too, the
"focus" and "purpose" test does not contain any built-in factors
which limit the test to police station interrogations, for there
are many other situations where the focus is on the accused and
the purpose is to elicit a confession or damaging admissions.
The principal thrust of this section, then, will be to indicate
Escobedo's "potential for expansion," -to explore the meaning
of the "focus" and "purpose" test in this context and to indicate
some of the problems raised by extension of the right to counsel
to cover various situations.
70. See LOCKHART, KAAsAn & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 89-40
(Supp. 1964), where, after noting that the Escobedo opinion fluctuates from
"sweeping language" to underscoring the particular facts of the case, the
authors suggest that "its meaning depends on how far and how fast a majority of the Court is willing to use the opinion's potential for expansion."
71. 11 N.Y.ed 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962).
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PURPOSE TO ELICIT A CON-

FESSION

These new terms of art are not defined in Escobedo except by
reference to each other and to the facts of that case. The Court

does not say, for example, whether a subjective or objective test
is to be used, or some combination of the two, and the meaning
of "focus" and "purpose" is left open.
As to "focus," the problem may be shown by a simple example.
Let us suppose that there is a robbery and the victim describes
his assailant. Six suspects fit the description; the witness cannot

choose between them, and the police wish to question all six.
In this case there is no focus in the sense that any one man is
the principal suspect; indeed the police would lack probable cause
to arrest any one of the suspects. The purpose of the questioning,
however, would be to elicit a confession or statements inconsistent
with innocence from one of the suspects. In this sense there is
focus. In view of the problem with which the Court was dealing and its coupling of "focus" with "purpose to elicit a confession," it would seem that this latter sense of focus was the one
intended.
The test of "purpose" is probably, at least in part, an objective
one. Where a confession is challenged under Escobedo, one resolution could be a voir dire examination in which the police who
interrogated the defendant are called upon to testify as to what
their purpose was in questioning the accused. The Court does
not expressly exclude this possibility, nor does it discuss the
question of whether probable cause is the test. Where probable
cause exists, however, or even where the accused was part of a
group of suspects, as in the example above, it is highly unlikely
that a police witness's disclaimer of purpose to elicit a confession
would suffice to validate the confession taken in the absence of
counsel. Indeed, a subjective test runs the risk of forcing the
police to approach their testimony with some cynicism, itself an
undesirable development for law enforcement.
Escobedo and recent applications of the "focus" and "purpose"
test in the California Supreme Court seem to suggest an objective approach measured by the weight of the evidence available
to the police at the point of interrogation. 72 Presumably, in none
72. People v. Dorado, 394 P.2d 952, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1964); People v.
Anderson, 394 P.2d 945, 40 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1964). Reargument has been ordered
in both cases. See Cal. Rehearing and Hearing Table at i, iv, in 40 Cal. Rptr.
issue no. 10 (Nov. 16, 1964). But of. United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844,
849-53 (8d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. fded, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3166 (U.S. Nov.
3, 1964) (No. 596), discussed in text accompanying notes 77-80 infra.
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of these cases did the police officers concerned testify as to their
subjective purposes since the trials were all held before the Court
announced this test. If a subjective test were intended, a more
appropriate course in each case would have been a remand to the
trial court to explore the issue in light of the police testimony and
all other relevant evidence. Instead, the courts seem to have
looked solely to the objective evidence.
Under the English Judges' Rules, before their recent amendment,7 3 the police were called upon to give a warning once they
had made up their mind to charge the defendant. Some writers
thought this test was an objective one based upon probable
cause;74 others argued that the decision to charge could in fact
be and often was postponed. 75 An objective test is even more
likely for the new American rule, for it is noteworthy that the
question of "purpose to elicit a confession" may be more readily
determined from the objective evidence - such as the nature of
the questions and accusations put to the defendant and the length
of the interrogation - than the question whether the police had
decided to charge the defendant.
Whether the test be objective or subjective, the point of reference is the investigating officers' purpose. Purpose may often be
as elusive a concept here as it is in other contexts. For example,
there is the common phenomenon of mixed purposes. When the
police officer has made up his mind that the suspect is guilty, his
sole purpose in questioning him will usually be to obtain a confession. When the police have not made up their mind, however,
their purpose in questioning may be less focused, if we may use
that word. The purpose of such questioning may be to test the
suspect under tension, to determine whether he is guilty, or to
help the police decide whether to charge him. If he confesses,
only then will the police decide that he is their man. If he does
not confess, the police may very well decide that despite some
suspicious looking evidence, he is not the guilty party. Under
such circumstances the person interrogated is not an accused in
the eyes of the police. Do Massiah and Escobedo apply to this
latter case?
Perhaps even more common is the situation where the police
78. The new rules are printed in 1964 Cm. L. REV. (Eng.) 166-70. The
old Rules appear in Devlin, op. cit. supra note 52, at 137-41.
74. Devlin, op. cit. supra note 52, at 84-86; A Forum on the Interrogation
.
377, 891-92 (1964).
of the Accused, 49 CoRNI L.Q.
75. Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confession, 52
Nw. U.L. REv. 77, 83-84 (1957); Williams, Questioning by the Police: Some
PracticalConsiderations,1960 CRm. L. RLv. (Eng.) 825, 327.
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question a suspect not to test him under tension but with no
purpose in mind other than to elicit truthful answers, be they
denials or admissions, and with no preconceived idea of what
0 Justices
answers they want and expect. In Gallegos v. Nebraska,"
Frankfurter and Jackson suggested that the dangers involved in
coercive questioning are not present when the police are not trying
to make the facts fit a preconceived theory of the case. Yet in
a very real sense one of the police purposes in questioning the
suspect is to obtain a confession. If an uncounseled suspect confesses in response to such police questioning, do Massiah and
Escobedo require exclusion of his confession? Suppose he denies
his guilt, offering some explanation of his suspicious looking conduct, and his denials or explanations are later disproved by the
police. Is this evidence tainted?
Considering the weak evidence available against Escobedo the unsworn and uncorroborated statement of an admitted participant in the crime who had every motive to try to shift the
blame to Escobedo - one wonders with which of these possible
senses of "purpose to elicit a confession" the police who interrogated him acted. The Court did not touch on this issue.
Instructive in this regard is the very recent Third Circuit
7 where FBI agents
decision in United States v. Konigsberg,"
arrested several persons in a garage which contained a large
quantity of stolen goods. At the FBI office prior to preliminary
arraignment, the agents asked Konigsberg "why he was in this
garage and just what had taken place, . . . if he wished to cleanse
himself or explain, . . . [and] why the other individuals were

there."7 8 Konigsberg's incriminating replies were received in evidence against him and he was convicted. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed, in part because there was evidence to support
the trial judge's determination that he had been advised of his
right to counsel. (Konigsberg had denied being so advised.) Despite the existence of probable cause to arrest Konigsberg and
the others, the court held further that the questioning process
was "investigative" rather than "accusatory," and distinguished
76. 342 U.S. 55, 71-73 (1951).
77. 386 F.2d 844, 849-53 (3d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. fded, 33 U.SL.
WE=n 3166 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1964) (No. 596). Compare the similar circumstances
in R. v. White, noted in [1964] CIam. L. REv. (Eng.) 720, dealing with application of the English Judges' Rules. In White the police found the appellants
in a garage containing stolen goods. When asked what they were doing there,
appellants made incriminating statements later used in evidence. The Court
upheld the convictions notwithstanding the fact that a caution by the police
was not given until after the incriminating statements had been made.
78. 386 F.2d at 852.
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Escobedo on the ground that the questioning did not constitute
an "interrogation" but was a "conversation" in which the agents
did not attempt to elicit a confession from Konigsberg but merely
offered him an opportunity to explain his presence at the garage.
While the Third Circuit thus seems to exclude the last sense of
"purpose," and to limit Escobedo to cases involving aggressive
interrogation, with repeated accusations and the like," our earlier
discussion of Escobedo and Massiah suggests that it is far from
clear that this is what the Supreme Court had in mind. It is
interesting to note in this regard that the Third Circuit in Konigsberg made no reference to Massiah and its possible implications.
A panel of the District of Columbia Circuit, on the other hand,
appears to have expressed the view in Greenwell v. United
States,s0 that Escobedo and Massiah require the suppression of
a confession obtained from an uncounseled accused during any
interview, aggressive or mild.
The difficulty with the more limited right to counsel suggested
in Konigsberg is that, at least in state cases which do not have a
McNabb rule,"' it invites dispute between the police and the
defendant over just how "aggressive" the questioning really was.
Significantly, Greenwell, which was decided on McNabb grounds,
involved just such a dispute.
More precise definition of these concepts, perhaps forthcoming
in future cases, might give the police at least reasonable guidance
as to their duties. Such is not the case, however, with other law
enforcement agencies whose activities might well come within
the ambit of such a test. We refer primarily to grand juries and
to administrative agencies which, like the police, have the duty
of investigating crime and also attempt to obtain confessions or
admissions from suspects.
A grand jury has both investigative and accusatory functions.
The proceedings are secret and traditionally only the witnesses,
prosecuting attorneys, and stenographers or other clerical assistants have been permitted to participate with the grand jurors,
since these persons, minimally, are necessary to assist the grand
jury. When the grand jury functions as an accusatory body
there may now be a constitutional prohibition against examining
suspects in the absence of counsel. For the federal courts, cases
79. Compare the similar distinction drawn in Rothblatt &Rothblatt, supra
note 46, at 47-48, with respect to application of the McNabb rule.
80. 336 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dictum). But of. the conflicting
opinions in Jackson v. United States, 387 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
81. See discussion in part V infra.
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such as the Second Circuit decisions of United States v. Cleary"
and United States v. Scully, 3 which permit the questioning of
suspects before the grand jury without counsel and possibly without even a warning as to the privilege against self-incrimination,
may have been overruled by implication in light of the new test,
and a right to counsel in the grand jury may have been substituted.
It is much easier to state the foregoing proposition, however,
than to apply it in many areas of grand jury practice. The widespread and intricate investigations by federal grand juries, particularly in such fields as antitrust and the securities laws, do
not lend themselves to simple tests of "focus" or "purpose" or
even "probable cause." The existence of probable cause may conceivably be determined after analysis of a lengthy record, but
when the grand jurors or prosecutors have not yet analyzed their
record, or have done so only tentatively or hastily, or have made
an error -

as happens in any large human enterprise

-

they

may not realize it. Yet hindsight under the new test, particularly
if the test is to be objective, could serve to vitiate much of their
work by suppressing testimony taken after what later appears
to be the crucial point.
Permitting attorneys to be present in the grand jury room
during the taking of testimony might constitute a serious breach
of grand jury secrecy which could hamper investigations and
prosecutions. 4 The courts will have to deal with the question
of how the issue whether "focus" and "purpose" exist is to be
litigated in advance of a witness's appearance before the grand
jury. A collateral adversary proceeding raises the same problems
of premature disclosure of grand jury proceedings, since dis82. 265 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 860 U.S. 936 (1959).
83. 225 Fad 113 (9d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1956).
84. Although the witness himself is not bound to secrecy, FED. R. CRM.
P. 6(e), the lawyer will probably recall more about the areas explored in the
questioning and will be more able to infer therefrom the nature of the evidence available to the grand jury. This is both because he is trained in such
skills and because he is an observer rather than a participant in the proceedings. The problem could become particularly acute in an investigation directed
toward an organized criminal group where each witness might appear before
the grand jury with the same lawyer.
Rule 6(e) does impose secrecy on "attorneys." In view of the present
practice of excluding defense counsel from the grand jury room, this word
probably refers only to the prosecuting attorneys. There may be some question whether it would be permissible constitutionally to impose secrecy upon
defense counsel since he might have to discuss the case with prospective
witnesses even before indictment. In any event, counsel could easily circumvent a requirement of secrecy by dealing with witnesses through his client.
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closure of the grand jury record would be required in order to
determine whether the focus is on the witness-accused.s The
prospect of such disclosure might even increase the contentiousness of prospective witnesses." A collateral nonadversary proceeding, particularly in a large, complex grand jury investigation,
would deprive the judge of the assistance of counsel in winnowing the record and narrowing the area of dispute.
Possibly, the test here could be subjective, since prosecutors
and grand jurors who are directly responsible to the court might
be relied upon more than the police. But in any event premature
disclosure of the prosecution's evidence might become necessary
to permit adequate cross-examination of such witnesses concerning their purpose. Furthermore, presenting a witness with an issue
of his right to counsel, which he can litigate before he has to
testify, can create great delays in grand jury procedure, further
complicating the task of assembling a body of 23 citizens to hear
testimony over a long period. And if the issue is appealable, it
might become possible for witnesses to delay the grand jury for
long periods of time, even beyond the end of its term.
Similarly, the Escobedo test would apparently apply to investigations by administrative agencies, with even greater problems
of application. The irony of this is that administrative agencies,
which do not use armed personnel and have an atmosphere wholly
different from the police station, present few if any problems of
coercion. Despite the numerous motions which are normally made
in federal criminal prosecutions arising out of administrative investigations, the charge of coerced confession is rarely, if ever,
heard. Indeed, in some fields, the problem has been the timid
investigator's fear of the witnesses. Nevertheless, the terms of
Massiakh and Escobedo apply to these proceedings, and most of
the Court's majority for those decisions have already said in a
previous decision that there should be a right to counsel during
85. Nor is there any logical reason why such disclosure should be limited
to the record already made before the grand jury. Presumably, the evidence
available in the prosecutor's files is no less relevant to determining "purpose"
and "focus."
86. A witness who litigates these issues and has learned all he wants to
know about the prosecution's evidence might still refuse to testify before
the grand jury on fifth amendment grounds. We should hesitate before treating the raising of this issue by the witness as a waiver of his fifth amendment
privilege. It might be, for example, that the disclosures show him to be in
greater danger of self incrimination than he feared. It is doubtful whether
there would be any practical way of controlling abuses short of the prosecution conceding the point and permitting counsel to be present in the grand
jury room every time the issue is raised.
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administrative investigations which might lead to criminal
prosecution. 7
The problems involved in administering the right to counsel
in this area become more apparent if we consider as an example
the investigation by the SEC of the distribution of unregistered
stock. In the first place, though persons may be suspect and the
SEC may have probable cause, the investigation may start out
as, a purely civil one, aimed at policing the securities markets
through civil sanctions. Though the investigators may be seeking incriminating admissions, the question of whether to seek
criminal sanctions would normally be decided late in the investigation, after considerable debate in which the issue would be
not only the sufficiency of the evidence but also the general advisability of making a criminal case in that area given the nature,
scope and extent of the violations, the difficulties and cost of
prosecution, the previous history of the prospective defendants,
and so on. When do "focus" and "purpose" enter the proceedings? In the administrative area this test becomes almost hopeless to apply unless of course it is to be applied equally to the
civil enforcement activities of the agencies.
Administrative investigations frequently lack the coordination of the typical police investigation. They are often conducted
out of several offices. Hundreds of people are likely to be interviewed in such an investigation, quite often all persons whose
names appear in the stock transfer records of the company whose
unregistered stock has been sold. An objective test of "focus,"
such as probable cause, is workable where the investigating personnel are few and all are aware of the full scope of the investigation at any one time. In the wide-flung administrative investigation, however, the "focus" and "purpose" test of the simple
crime once again breaks down.
We have shown that even in the context of police investigations, "purpose" may be an inappropriate term. In the typical
administrative investigation, "purpose to elicit a confession" may
be even more removed from the forefront of the investigator's
numerous and varied conscious purposes. In many cases the
purpose of an interview is to obtain admissions or leads to others.
Where appropriate, experienced investigators will aim behind
the outer fringe of minor offenders to ascertain and reach the
central figures. But major offenders do turn up among the initial
witnesses. Must all initial witnesses have counsel? Perhaps those
who turn out to be minor offenders will never have standing to
87. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 380, 337 (1957) (dissenting opinion); of. Anonymous v. Baker, 860 U.S. 287, 298 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
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raise this question, but the problem arises for those who turn
out to be defendants, and who thus do have standing to complain.
B. AssumNG THE AVAHAEMiTY oF CouNsEL.
Danny Escobedo had retained a lawyer who knew about the
interrogation but was denied access to his client. Many or most
suspects when called for questioning have not retained a lawyer,
and a large number of these persons could not afford a lawyer
even if they were given an opportunity to retain and consult
counsel before interrogation.
The defendant who can afford counsel but has not requested
the opportunity to consult with a lawyer would seem to require
counsel and protection no less than one who already has retained
an attorney or knows his rights sufficiently to request counsel.
The California Supreme Court recently so ruled, stating:
The defendant who does not realize his rights under the law and who
therefore does not request counsel is the very defendant who most
needs counsel. We should not penalize the defendant who, not understanding his legal rights, does not make the formal request and by
such failure demonstrates his helplessness. 3

Reason and authority would seem to require no less for the
indigent defendant who cannot afford his own lawyer. Whether
the right be one to make informed tactical decisions or to
protection from coercion, the Court could hardly have intended
these benefits only for those affluent and educated citizens who
normally have access to counsel.
It is difficult to see the relevance of a request for counsel to the
constitutional right asserted. Denial of such a request or interference with access to counsel by the police might be thought to
furnish additional evidence of the existence of a police "purpose
to elicit a confession," but this is no longer to talk of counsel
as a constitutional right. Under Escobedo the ascertainment of
88. People v. Dorado, 394 P.2d 952, 956, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268 (1964),
rehearing ordered, Cal. Rehearing and Hearing Table at i, iv in 40 Cal. Rptr.
issue no. 10 (Nov. 16, 1964). Dorado is followed in Cruz v. Delgado, 233 F.
Supp. 944 (D.P.R. 1964). See also Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.,
1964); Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962, 967 (D.C. Cir., 1964)
(dictum). But see People v. Hartgraves, 33 U.S.L. WEmE 2163 (R1. Sept. 29,
1964); Parker v. Warden, 903 A.2d 418 (Md. 1964); Sturgis v. Maryland, 9235
Md. 334, 201 A.2d 681 (1964); State v. Scanlon, 84 NJ. Super. 427, 202 A.2d
448,453-54 (App. Div. 1964). In Carson v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 85, (Ky.
1964), the court held that the defendant had waived his right to counsel since
he had been advised of his right. The court did not consider whether appointed
counsel must be offered to an indigent defendant.
89. Of. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); United States ex rel.
Durocher v. LaVallee, 380 Fd 303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 877 U.S. 998 (1964).
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purpose is relevant to determine when the defendant needs
counsel, not vice-versa. It is conceivable that the Court would
treat the denial of a request for counsel as per se coercion, perhaps on the ground that when the police seek out a confession
there is greater danger of coercion than when they have no such
preconceived purpose in mind - an approach somewhat similar
to McNabb-Mallory in federal prosecutions - and devise other
rules for cases in which the defendant did not request counsel.
But making the choice of rule turn on fortuitous circumstances
of such marginal relevance would probably not promote proper
administration of the Court's rules. It would seem better to use
McNabb-Mallory itself, as we suggest in Part V below.
Thus, once the right to counsel attaches, however the test be
phrased, a suspect without a lawyer probably would have to be
advised of this right and given an opportunity to retain counsel.
For the indigent, counsel would have to be appointed, or at least
he would have to be advised that he has a right to appointed
counsel 0 o Any confession obtained from a person at the "accusatory" stage without complying with these procedures would be
suppressed as obtained in violation of the accused's right to
counsel.
The most obvious problem of compliance with such procedures
is that of providing counsel for the numerous routine police interviews. We have yet to ascertain the full impact upon the States
of the cost of assigning counsel to the indigent for all pleas and
trials. ex But trials are relatively few and pleas take up little of
assigned counsel's time. The cost of assigning counsel for untold
numbers of police interviews may be prohibitive, with the result
that the police might be forced to cease routine questioning of
suspects. The functions which appointed counsel would be called
upon to perform here, moreover, are quite removed from participation at trial and, because of the hours and duties involved,
much more burdensome to the lawyers personally and to the
States financially. 2
Less obvious are the problems posed by the nonindigent sus90. Appointed counsel, who knows nothing about his client or the background of the case, cannot advise his client to answer questions until he has
had an opportunity to investigate the case. This further supports the suggestion made above that the "easy way out" will -be to advise clients not to talk.
91. Federal costs are also to be considered. The schedule of fees provided
by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9784
[18 U.S.C. § 8006A(d)], though a start, may well prove to be unrealistically
low.
92. In all likelihood, legal aid societies and public defender officers will
assign their new inexperienced men to this low-level operation. An inex-
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pect who has not yet retained counsel. A recalcitrant witness
could procrastinate in retaining counsel for the purpose of delaying the proceedings and cooling off an urgent investigation. And
the introduction of litigable issues, such as claims of indigency
and the existence of "focus" and "purpose," offer the reluctant
witness still further opportunities for delay. It is true that a reluctant witness or one bent upon obstructing an investigation
can refuse to talk with the investigator unless subpoenaed before
the grand jury or an agency, but few dare to be so transparently
evasive. The intrusion of a constitutional right to counsel at this
point, however, gives such persons an opportunity to manipulate
this right to camouflage their obstructionist purposes.
It is not clear, moreover, who is to appoint counsel in an
administrative investigation and where, if necessary, the issue
of indigency can be litigated. 3 The grand jury functions as an
arm of the court and these problems can be brought before the
court for solution. In the case of police interrogation, extension
of legal aid services and of the work of voluntary defender offices
may suffice. Also, if the suspect is under arrest, the police can
ask for the appointment of counsel and resolution of the claim
of indigency at the preliminary arraignment. In the case of administrative investigations, however, there is no matter pending
before the courts and the courts may not have jurisdiction to
appoint counsel or litigate indigency. Thus, the responsibility
for the appointment of counsel may fall upon the agencies, which
lack the relationship to the Bar and the moral influence that
a court has over its officers and which it calls upon when appointing counsel. In addition, agencies, particularly federal agencies,
may be located far from the scene of the investigation thereby
complicating the problems of litigation, with the possibility of
administrative appeals, and the problems of appointment of
counsel. The foregoing suggests that administration of the right
to counsel, particularly in the administrative investigation, may
turn out to be an extremely complex matter.
C.

OTmER RAI\FICATIONS

1. Fruits
Perhaps the full sweep of Massiah and Escobedo will not be
perienced lawyer is even more likely to reason that he should take the safer
route of advising the client not to talk.
93. This problem arises not only with the recalcitrant witness. An investigator who is questioning a cooperative witness wants to be certain that the
answers and leads developed therefrom will be admissible in evidence in the
event that the witness turns out eventually to be a defendant.
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known until the Court passes on a case involving the "fruits of
the poisonous tree" doctrine. For what has been said about the
uncertainty and undesirability of the new "focus" and "purpose"
test would be greatly compounded if the Court were to hold that
not only the admissions obtained but all leads developed from
them were to be suppressed.
To take the example of our SEC investigation again, it may
be that in the first week of an investigation a witness states that
he resold unregistered stock to ten people whom he names. Those
ten are then interviewed and a two-year investigation of the matter is launched. Later the witness is indicted, and a judge, applying Escobedo by the objective test, holds that the focus was on
the witness and that the investigators' purpose was to secure
admissions. Must then the entire investigation be suppressed?
Had the investigators been forewarned, they might have sought
and obtained the same information from other sources.
Admittedly not all problems can be resolved in advance and
investigators must often run some risk of second guessing by
the courts. But they are entitled to a reasonable degree of guidance. And, as we have indicated, the "focus" and "purpose" test,
vague as it may be in the context of police questioning, is even
vaguer in the case of an administrative investigation.
It may be noted that under the English Judges' Rules, which
apply only to the police and therefore do not create the variety
of problems here discussed, one additional safety valve is the
absence of the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine.9 4 Thus,
even if the police officer has guessed wrong, all that is lost is the
confession itself. A lengthy investigation based on admissions
or false denials would be salvaged.
2.

Informers and Undercover Agents

The general problem posed for undercover work was stated
by Mr. Justice White, dissenting in Massiah: "
The general issue lurking in the background of the Court's opinion is
the legitimacy of penetrating or obtaining confederates in criminal
organizations. For the law enforcement agency, the answer for the time
being can only be in the form of a prediction about the future application of today's new constitutional doctrine. More narrowly, and posed
by the precise situation involved here, the question is this: when the
police have arrested and released on bail one member of a criminal ring
and another member, a confederate, is cooperating with the police, can
the confederate be allowed to continue his association with the ring
94. Williams, supra note 75, at 328; A Forum on the Interrogation of the
Accused, 49 Conums L.Q. 877, 392, 897-98 (1964).
95. 877 U.S. at 212.
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or must he somehow be withdrawn to avoid challenge to trial evidence
on the ground that it was acquired after rather than before the arrest,
after rather than before the indictment?

The problem is whether the undercover agent must be withdrawn from the ring after arrest or indictment of one or more of the
ring's members. Justice White hints at the difficulties of withdrawing the undercover agent. It would cause the drying up of
information concerning what is often a continuing criminal operation; there is also a real danger to the undercover agent, for withdrawal soon after an indictment gives a strong indication as to
who has informed and complicates problems of security until trial.
Justice White did not treat the undercover problem in his
Escobedo dissent, but Escobedo raises even greater problems in
this area. In the case of a ring, the "focus" may well be on all its
members at the very outset of the undercover work. If, on the
other hand, "focus" first appears at a later point, the undercover
agent may never be able to determine when that point has been
reached so that he must withdraw. And presumably the agent's
purpose always would be to elicit admissions, among other evidence. Undercover work obviously becomes impossible under
such circumstances.
Perhaps a line will be drawn between cases where evidence is
being sought as to past, concluded illegal activities, and those
where such activities are continuing." Undercover work would
be permitted within the ring if its illegal activities continue after
indictment, as is frequently the case, for example, in organized
narcotics rings. But the authorities do not know in advance
whether the ring will continue its operations. As a practical matter, and in pursuance of their duties to the public, the investigating bodies may be obligated to keep their informers and undercover men in such rings after indictment in order to find out what
is happening. If so, the investigator should report everything he
has heard even if, so far as he alone knows, such information does
not demonstrate continued illegal activity, since when combined
with other information available to his superiors it may show
such continued activities. This entails a risk that the information
provided may not in the end show continuing illegal activities,
and the entire case may be jeopardized. 7 Again, elimination of
96. Cf. Vinyard v. United States, 335 F.2d 176, 183-84 (8th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WEEr 3091 (U.S. Sept. 12, 1964) (No. 493).
97. One of the authors was confronted with this very problem while an
Assistant United States Attorney. Five persons had been arrested in connection with the illegal possession of certain goods. One of the five, an employee
of two other members of the group, had been informing the government con-
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the "fruits" doctrine might prove to be a sufficient safety valve.

3.

Loss of Reliable Evidence Through Exclusion of Official
Witnesses

The facts of the Massiah case themselves point up an additional undesirable aspect of the new rule. As has been indicated,
Colson, a co-defendant, held a conversation with Massiah which
was overheard by a federal agent through the device of a radio
transmitter. Colson, who could also have testified, was later

frightened into silence by threats. The federal official remained
available to testify. We have already indicated that had Colson
engaged Massiah in the conversation without the knowledge and
connivance of the federal agent, testimony by Colson concerning
the conversation would have been admissible. But Colson's testimony would have been substantially less reliable than that of a
federal agent since a confederate has more motive to color his
testimony, and because persons such as Colson are not trained,
as are agents, to make accurate observations and to record their
observations promptly after the event.
The import of these observations is that the intrusion of
officials does more than raise fifth and sixth amendment problems;
it also increases the reliability of the evidence which the jury
will hear, and indeed, where witnesses have been threatened, it
may provide the only source of reliable evidence. Perhaps it is
better to use the defendant's own words, taken by a trained agent,
which constitute reliable evidence, than to rest solely on the
words of the Colsons or to let the issue turn on the Colsons' readiness to testify.

4.

On-the-Street Detentionand Questioning

Recent years have seen debate over the propriety of police
stopping persons on the street for questioning with less than
probable cause."5 This is not the place to enter into this controversy, but it is important to point out the implications of Massiah
cerning the group's illegal activities, but was arrested with the group to
prevent the others from learning that he had informed. Each was questioned
briefly concerning his personal and financial circumstances relevant to the
fixing of bail. As each was questioned, the others remained together in another
room. The informant advised the interviewers that the defendants in their
private room were discussing how to intercept an additional illegal shipment
of merchandise which was still en route. As it turned out this information
revealed a continuing criminal enterprise, but there was no way of knowing
this in advance.
98. E.g., Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth
Amendment, 1960 SUPREME COURT Ray. 46; Remington, The Lao Relating
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and Escobedo for this problem. For example, suppose that in the
early morning hours a police officer sees a man dressed in work
clothes carrying an expensive looking suitcase in a neighborhood
where there are some tourist hotels. Probable cause may not exist
to arrest him for theft. May the police stop him and question him
about his possession of the suitcase? Applying the "focus" and
"purpose" test, it becomes apparent that focus on the individual
exists though in a sense different from that in the more typical
police investigation. Typically, a crime has been committed and
the police focus is on one or more suspects. Here, all of the police
focus is on this one person but there is a question whether any
crime has been committed; if one has, this person is the culprit.
In a real sense then the focus is on this person. As for "purpose
to elicit a confession," the policeman's purpose clearly is to elicit
truthful information whether it be an exculpating explanation
or inculpating admissions.
This stage of the investigation is no less critical for our hypothetical suspect than it was for Escobedo. Will admissions made
by this person be excluded because of the lack of counsel? If so,
then the current debate concerning this problem has been rendered moot. And if the police cannot question this person, the
pressures may become greater to permit them to adopt the more
drastic alternative of detaining him, "arresting" him if you will,
until they can investigate the circumstances. Massiah and
Escobedo, then, if applied to these circumstances, as the current
test may require, may lead to even greater invasions of citizens'
rights. In any event, the issues underlying this problem deserve
to be explored and resolved on their own merits and not disposed
of under the right-to-counsel rubric.
5.

Escobedo and Wong Sun

Wong Sun v. United States" holds that confessions and
admissions made after an illegal arrest by federal officers, i.e.,
where the arresting agents lack probable cause, are inadmissible
in federal prosecutions. Escobedo may preclude all questioning after a legal arrest, i.e., where probable cause exists, except
in the presence of defense counsel. This would seem to mean that
federal police - and state police if Wong Sun is extended to
cover them -may safely question a person without counsel only
when that person appears voluntarily for questioning. Recent
decisions, however, appear to be narrowing the circumstances in
to "on the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons
and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CnRm. L., C. & P.S. 886 (1960).
99. 871 U.S. 471 (1968).
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which an appearance for questioning will be held to have been
voluntary.c0o Further developments in this area may then preclude all police questioning as a practical matter.
V. ALTERNATE SOLUTIONS
As valid as the above arguments may be, the problem of police
interrogation continues to present abuses and still seeks solution.
The problems are real and have yet to be resolved by the caseby-case review of claims of coercion essayed these past thirty
years.
Secret police interrogation of suspects raises two very serious
problems here relevant. First is the difficult problem of proof.
All too frequently a defendant's charges of brutality are met by
police denials. Even when no brutality is charged, there is often
conflicting testimony whether inducements and/or threats were
employed. The defendant who has in fact been the victim of
police illegality has the cards heavily stacked against him: often
he has a prior criminal record which adversely affects his credibility; it is frequently clear that the confession is truthful and
this factor may well impel the trier to believe the police; and trial
judges, whose evaluations of credibility are ordinarily immune
from review, are subject to heavy local pressures to believe the
police and help convict the criminal. When none of these factors
is present, it is still difficult for the judge not to accept the word
of those entrusted with law enforcement, who will confront him
in his courtroom many more times, against the word of the defendant. Finally, even when the police concede having made the
statements attributed to them by the defendant, the inarticulate
defendant may have substantial difficulty in creating the coercive
tenor and atmosphere of the questioning.
Secondly, secret interrogation of even the mildest sort tends
to be coercive. The police perhaps know to what limits they
are prepared to go in order to obtain their confession. The defendant most certainly does not. As time passes, politely if you
will, the defendant must begin to wonder how long his detention
will last. And he soon perceives the answer, or at least what he
believes to be the answer: until he confesses. So far as the defendant is aware - alone, often without anyone knowing or caring
where he is, or without legal and financial means to secure his
release, and in the dark concerning the intentions of the police the fear of indefinite detention can be dispelled only by giving
100. Compare Seals v. United States, 325 FR2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 876 U.S. 964 (1964), with United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524, 527-29
(2d Cir. 1961) (alternate holding), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962).
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the police what they want.
One solution to this serious problem is, of course, to forbid any
and all police interrogation of suspects. Few today would urge
such a course.'o' The solution offered by Massiah and Escobedo
is to require the presence of counsel during the interrogation. No
doubt this would provide a credible witness to the proceedings.
It would also eliminate the defendant's fear of indefinite detention since counsel could advise the defendant of the limits placed
upon the police and of the availability of habeas corpus. But, as
we have demonstrated, it may also eliminate proper questioning.
We believe that these abuses may be controlled by more
workable and less drastic means: by extending to the States the
McNabb-Mallory rule or some variation thereof0 2 and by requiring that all police interviews with witnesses at places controlled
by the police, and wherever else feasible, be recorded stenographically or electrically.
The McNabb-Mallory rule as applied to federal prosecutions
requires the exclusion at trial of a confession given by a defendant while detained in violation of the requirement of rule 5(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that an arrested
person be brought before a judicial officer "without unnecessary
delay." In combination with its companion rule 5(b), rule 5(a)
guarantees at a minimum that before too long a period elapses,
the defendant will be advised by an impartial judicial officer of
his legal rights. More significantly, the rule makes impossible the practice of secret detention. A public record of the
detention has been made and the defendant has been removed
from the uncontrolled custody of the investigative agencies and
their officers to his freedom on bail or at the least to the custody of the United States Marshal and federal detention officers,
none of whom have any particular interest in the outcome of
101. Rogge, Book Review, 76 HIAv. LAw REv. 1516 (1963), comes very
close Yto such a suggestion.
102. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). It is also possible to combine a McNabb approach
with counsel in the following manner: a confession obtained during a period
of permissible delay would be admissible even if the defendant had no counsel,
while one obtained during a period of longer detention would be admissible
only if counsel were present during the interrogation. The attempt to limit
Escobedo essayed in Konigsberg, see text accompanying notes 77-80 supra,
would be more workable under such a combined scheme. Mr. Justice Douglas,
however, has indicated that before a confession obtained by the police from
a person under detention would be admissible, he would require both prompt
arraignment and the presence of counsel. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 448
(1961) (concurring opinion).
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the case. Similarly, in the federal practice supervision of the case
by this time is no longer under the control of the investigative
agency and its officers, but has come under the control of the
United States Attorney who is much more directly under the
control and moral influence of the court. Finally, McNabb, in
recognition of the relevance of time - prolonged, unrelenting interrogation with its wearing down of the defendant's will to resist
-places
a relatively short time limit upon the length of the
interrogation. Indeed, the Supreme Court once characterized
McNabb as an "experiment [which] has been made in an attempt
to abolish the opportunities for coercion which prolonged detention without a hearing is said to enhance."es Apparently, most
cases in which long delays have been permitted did not involve the
pressures of lengthy interrogation with their risk of coercion.' 04
The point of McNabb is that in the short time available to the
police, little can happen that can be deemed coercive.
Application of McNabb to the States should go far toward
accomplishing these same ends. It would have the advantage
over the Escobedo rule of both relative ease of application and
of not eliminating confessions obtained as a result of short uncoercive questioning. While protecting the defendant's rights, it
would not convert the decision to confess into a tactical decision.
Although a short period of questioning effectively precludes
physical brutality and psychological coercion, it may be urged
that some, though concededly limited, room is still left for the
tender of threats and/or promises to induce a confession. Furthermore, in cases of prolonged delay, the McNabb test may not
103. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953).
104. Even in United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962), which gives the police considerable leeway in questioning a suspect before arraignment, the court stressed the fact that extra
time would be permitted only "when needed for investigation rather than
merely repetitions interrogation. . . so long as certain safeguards are observed."
294 F.2d at 533. (Emphasis added.) The crucial facts, so far as the court was concerned, were that the defendant readily discussed the case with the agents
from the very beginning, that the delay in arraignment was not used to "break
his will" but to check out his explanations, and that he confessed when it was
demonstrated that his explanations had been proved false.
While it is far from clear what circumstances will justify delaying the preliminary arraignment, see Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1018-20, it is our impression that there exists a consensus among most federal judges and
prosecutors that delay solely for the purpose of eliciting a confession is illegal.
As the Yale Law Journal Comment indicates, id. at 1019-20, Heideman v.
United States, 259 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 959 (1959),
is one of the few cases to raise the point squarely. Perhaps the reason that such
delays are rarely reported in appellate opinions is that most federal prosecutors
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eliminate disputes between the defendant and the police over
what caused the delay. For example, the defendant might claim
that he was interrogated for several hours while the police could
insist that the time was used not for questioning but for checking
out the defendant's story. As a practical matter, such problems
do not seem to have arisen too often in federal practice. In any
event, they can be safeguarded against by requiring that a record
be kept of all conversations between the police and the defendant,105 such record to include a statement of the time during
which the interview began and ended. While a police officer who
is willing to coerce a confession may be tempted with some cynicism to indulge at trial in what he believes to be a white lie,sos
it is doubtful that many officers would dare tamper with physical
evidence such as a stenographer's notes or a tape recording. Furthermore, it could be required that the record be deposited with
the court under seal at the time the defendant is brought before
the court for preliminary arraignment oM
The advantage of such a procedure lies not only in the ease
with which the administrative details could be worked out.
Adoption of the requirement of a record would also represent a
logical step in the subjection of police practices to judicial control. As an indispensable aid to the review of actions of lower
courts and of administrative agencies, our law often requires
the preservation and preparation of a record of the proceedings
being reviewed. 0 s Extension of this requirement to police questioning would be a natural development in the judicial supervision of police questioning. This would, of course, still leave
open the period between arrest and the time the defendant is
brought to police headquarters, but that short space of time
leaves even the most willful police officer little room in which to
maneuver illegally.
Up to now, the Supreme Court has declined to apply McNabbMallory to the States directly. 09 However, the "inherently coand agents no longer engage in such practices, or at least, when they do, the
lower courts regularly exclude the confessions.
105. See Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons. A Skeptical
View, 52 J. Cnm. L., C. &P.S. 21, 44-45 (1961).
106. See McConncx, EvmNCE 23 (1954); Broeder, supra note 63, at 5s.
107. Of. Williams, supranote 75, at 842.
108. E.g., 60 Stat. 241-48 (1946), 5 U.S.C. M§1006(d), 1007(b), 1009(e)
(B)(5) (1958); 28 U.S.C. § 753 (1958).
109. Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600-01 (1961); Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156, 186-87 (1953); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 842 U.S. 55, 6-65 (1951); id. at 71-78 (concurring
opinion).
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ercive" approach begun in Ashcraft v. Tennessee' certainly represented a step in that direction, and it has been argued that
recent decisions in effect if not in form have applied McNabb to
the States."' If the basis for the McNabb-Mallory rule truly lies
in the Court's power to supervise federal officers who violate
federal rules of practice, can the Supreme Court constitutionally
impose such a rule upon the States? Can the Court require the
States to make a record of police station interviews? The answer
appears to be yes.
It should be obvious that prolonged secret detentions violate
the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process of law. To take a person into
custody, by definition a deprivation of liberty, and to hold him
incommunicado without opportunity to test the legality of his
detention is to accord him no process at all, let alone the legal
process due him." 2 Further, if we are correct in our conclusion
that the real issues at stake here are the effective enforcement
of one's due process and fifth amendment rights to be free from
rendering compelled, self-incriminating testimony, then it seems
clear that the Supreme Court has the constitutional power, indeed, the responsibility to formulate rules, and if necessary,
prophylactic rules, to effectuate such rights.
The Supreme Court perhaps cannot impose directly upon the
States the requirement that a record be kept of police interviews.
But it has the remedy of exclusion of the confession, and before
it imposes the drastic step of requiring counsel, it might afford
the States an opportunity to experiment with these less drastic
remedies. After all, this is precisely what the Court did for 12
3 After announcing the right of
years after Wolf v. Colorado."1
persons to be free from illegal searches and seizures by state
officials, it permitted the States to experiment with varied means
of enforcement. Only after such experiments failed or were not
forthcoming did the Court impose the most drastic remedy of
110. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
111. Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WAsH. & LEE 1. REv. 35 .(1962). Broeder, supra note
63, at 564-94, argues that McNabb should be extended to the States.
112. Due process would not seem to require immediate arraignment but
should be flexible enough to permit delay for the purposes now permitted under
the McNabb rule. Of. Comment, PrearraignmentInterrogation and the
McNabb-Mallory Miasma: A Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of
CriminalProcedure,68 YALE LJ. 1003, 1035-37 (1959). But see Broeder, supra
note 63, at 564-94.
113. 838 U.S. 25 (1949).
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exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.""' Also, Congress could
require the keeping of a record pursuant to its power to legislate
for the effectuation of fourteenth amendment rights."'
In some areas the details of McNabb remain to be worked
out. This is not the place to treat these areas in detail, but we
should indicate some highlights relevant to our present discussion.
One question occasionally raised is how to distinguish between
arrest and voluntary appearance at police headquarters in response to a "request" to come in for an interview. Last year's
decision in Seals v. United States' seems to represent a significant tightening of the screws in this area. After Escobedo, and
assuming the application of Wong Sun to state prosecutions, Seals
may represent a drastic closing of the only door left open to the
police. On the other hand, if a McNabb approach were substituted for Escobedo, the Seals case could represent a legitimate
attempt to bring most police station questioning under one test.
More serious, perhaps, is the problem of post-arraignment
interrogation. Here McNabb's time limitations do not operate at
all. Still the problem may not be as serious as it appears. Some
defendants are released on bail immediately following arraignment. Current attention devoted to the problems of bail" 7 may
in the near future see the release of many more. Those not released on bail have been advised of their rights and are no longer
being held in secret. And, as already indicated, in federal practice
and probably in most large metropolitan centers, the case has by
this point come under the jurisdiction of the district attorney
who is more sensitive to the influence of the courts than are the
police. The observation has been made in another context that
while the police are motivated principally to solve the crime and
may give little thought to the problems of trial, the prosecutor
is motivated to protect his case when it reaches the court.x" The
point is equally applicable here. Furthermore, if all of these
safeguards prove insufficient, it will then be time to impose the
requirement of counsel at the point of preliminary arraignment." 9
114. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 648 (1961).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
116. 325 F.2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 964 (1964).
117. See ATToRNEY GERNAls CozanrTE ON IOVERTY AND THE ADmUsTRATION OF FEDERAL CRImNAL JUsTICE, REPORT 58-89 (1963), and authorities
cited therein.
118. See Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment:
A Dialogue on "the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, s0 U. Cm. L. REV.
1, 8-9 (1962), and authorities cited therein.

119. The United States District Court's Rules of Criminal Procedure,

Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, Rules 5(b), 44, would
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This would completely remove any abuses during post-arraignment
interrogation while a McNabb test would operate in the prearraignment situation.'
Finally, explicit recognition of the relevance which prompt
arraignment bears to the problem of coerced confessions might
very well release McNabb in the federal courts from its dependence on Rule 5(a),i2 ' which still allows opportunity for prolonged
interrogation where the delay is otherwise justifiable.,M and permit the needed flexibility in its application in both state and
federal prosecutions. And the adoption of a record of the interview
might induce the courts to give the police somewhat more time
to question suspects than they allow at present under McNabb,
at least where the record shows that the questioning was not
aggressive or abusive.
Adoption of a McNabb test together with the requirement
that a record be kept of police station interviews would have the
added advantage that such a test would not be subject to the
pressure of expansion to administrative investigations. We have
already discussed the problems posed by Escobedo and Massiah
for administrative investigations. The difficulty with the Supreme
Court's test lies principally in that the right to counsel and the
standards enunciated for its application do not limit themselves
to the context in which they were first enunciated and from which
they arose. Although the problem of coerced confessions has
arisen exclusively in police investigations, the right to counsel
and the "focus" and "purpose" test may eventually expand (as
legal concepts often do) to cover circumstances far removed from
those which gave them their original force, here the administrative investigation. We believe that the approach we have suggested is better in that it articulates the standards in terms which
are geared to arrests and detention. Thus the standards limit
themselves to police investigations, the area where the problem
exists, and have no built-in tendency to overexpand.
Similarly, the problems posed by the use of undercover agents
assure the appointment of counsel for indigents no later than the defendant's
"initial appearance before the commissioner or the court."
120. An alternate legislative solution is suggested in Comment, 68 YAra
L.J. 1003, 1031-35 (1959). Still another approach is suggested by Ricks v.
United States, 334 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
121. See the discussion of this aspect of the McNabb rule in Comment, 68
YArm L.J. 1003, 1032 (1959).
122. It has been said, for example, that prolonged interrogation during a
period when a judicial officer is unavailable does not violate McNabb. United
States v. Ladson, 294 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 869 US. 824
(1962).
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could be approached on their own merits unobscured by the issue
of counsel. Since cases such as Massiah involve neither arrest nor
interrogation, our proposed McNabb test would be irrelevant.
The problems of the permissible limits of trickery, inherent in
undercover work, could then be analyzed and resolved directly.
One final problem raised under this heading involves the grand
jury which seems to lie somewhere between administrative and
police investigations. The atmosphere of the grand jury is certainly somewhat coercive, partly because the witness may fear
indictment, partly because of his unfamiliarity with the proceedings, and partly perhaps because of the general atmosphere of
secrecy. Also the witness is questioned by a skilled and trained
prosecutor who may very well be seeking to use the witness's
appearance as an opportunity to get a confession. Although traditionally counsel has not been permitted in the grand jury room,
it is the practice to allow the witness who has counsel to leave
the grand jury room at any time for consultation with his lawyer.
Still, a witness might be pressured and trapped in the grand jury
room, or at least sufficiently confused, to forget the presence of
his lawyer outside. The witness, nevertheless, has significant
protection in the presence of 23 citizens who presumably would
not permit the most serious abuses which are the focus of our
concern. Moreover, in many courts today grand jury proceedings
are recorded, and where they are not, the citizens who comprise
that body are available as witnesses to advise the court what
happened. On balance the problems do not appear sufficiently
serious to require the presence of counsel, and the issue should be
approached in terms of the voluntariness of the confession given

as was done in United States v. Cleary.12 3
CONCLUSION

As suggested, the future may see the Supreme Court withdraw
considerably from the broad language and implications of its
decisions in Massiah and Escobedo. In the meantime, however,
the lower courts - federal and state -

and law enforcement offi-

cers lack the guidance necessary to enable them to administer
the new tests. These undesirable effects, it seems to us, stem principally from the Court's failure to articulate its premises clearly
and to give adequate consideration to the availability of other
procedures. In the long run, the high moral concern of the Court
may be better served by slower institution of reforms that are
more likely to endure.
123. 265 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959).

